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Genuine media pluralism rarely occurs naturally or spontaneously. Rather, it is a goal to 
be aspired to and worked towards. Its realisation requires effort; sometimes conside-
rable effort and most often concerted and continuous effort. States have traditionally 
played a very influential role in the realisation of this goal at the national level. They 
can, as the title of this conference so eloquently puts it, “activate voices”, by developing 
legislation and mechanisms to prevent concentrations of media ownership and to facili-
tate access to the media. Paradoxically, States can also thwart the realisation of media 
pluralism by silencing voices, through discriminatory licensing regimes for broadcasting 
and disproportionate legislation governing content-restrictions, for example.
This article will explore some legal/human rights aspects of the evolving role of the Sta-
te in activating not only media voices – the typical focus of media pluralism discussions 
– but a wider range of non-media voices that ought to be heard in public debate. The ar-
gument driving this exploration is twofold. First, the media are no longer what they used 
to be, and second, the media no longer dominate public debate as they used to. In keeping 
with the theme of this section of the book, the exploration will extend beyond the role 
of the State and examine the relevance of European human rights law for the evolving 
role of the State. Particular attention will be paid to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (hereafter, ‘ECHR’), as interpreted in the case-law of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights (hereafter, ‘the Court’). It is hoped that this cursory reflection on selected 
human rights issues will provide useful initial input into a broader, multi-stranded policy 
discussion on how the State can best activate a diverse range of voices in an increasingly 
digitized world. That policy discussion is still incipient, but increasingly urgent. So far, 
the human rights thread has not been as prominent as it should be. 
42 Senior researcher, Institute for Information Law (IViR), Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam. This article 
draws, in places, on McGonagle, 2013. 
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II. Role(s) of the State
The relationship between the State and freedom of expression is typically cast in nega-
tive terms. Article 10(1), ECHR, for instance, guarantees everyone the “freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers” (emphasis added). This clearly places States under 
a negative obligation not to interfere with individuals’ right to freedom of expression. 
The obligation is, however, not absolute, as Article 10(1) also stipulates that States shall 
not be prevented from “requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema en-
terprises”. Article 10(2) then states that since the exercise of the right to freedom of 
expression carries with it duties and responsibilities, restrictions on the right may be 
permissible as long as they are “prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic so-
ciety, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection 
of the reputation or rights of others”, etc. Article 10(2) can therefore be said to reduce 
the scope of the individual right to freedom of expression and/or to provide states with 
a limited (but explicit) basis for interference with the right.
The conception of freedom of expression as “primarily a negative liberty” (Barendt, 2005: 
105) – freedom from State interference - also features prominently in academic litera-
ture. This negative conception is characteristic of a liberalist perspective on freedom 
of expression and it is grounded in a deep-seated distrust of government. The greater 
society’s suspicion of governmental motives and actions, the greater the need society 
will feel to ensure that governments cannot interfere with free expression. 
While typical, this conception of freedom of expression is nevertheless incomplete. Be-
sides creating a general duty of non-interference for States, the right to freedom of ex-
pression also gives rise to positive obligations for States (see further: Mowbray, 2005: 
78). The nature and extent of State obligations vary in accordance with the role being 
performed by the State in relation to freedom of expression. The State can and does 
assume different roles in this regard: it can “limit or suppress discussion”; “encourage 
better and more extensive communication”, or participate in public communication (Com-
mission on Freedom of the Press, 1947: 136). 
Under Article 1, ECHR, States are obliged to “secure” for everyone within their jurisdic-
tion a range of human rights, including the right to freedom of expression. This obligation 
necessarily involves ensuring that the right – like all other rights guaranteed by the ECHR 
- is not “theoretical or illusory”, but “practical and effective” (ECtHRs, 1979, § 24). As the 
Court has stated: “Genuine, effective exercise of this freedom does not depend merely on 
the State’s duty not to interfere, but may require positive measures of protection, even 
in the sphere of relations between individuals [...]” (ECtHRs, 2000a, § 43). Positive me-
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asures are, for instance, required in order for States to be able to fulfil their positive 
obligations to protect everyone’s right to life; investigate fatalities, and prevent torture 
and ill-treatment (grouping borrowed from Leach, 2013: 8-11). States are also required 
to take positive measures to safeguard (media) pluralism and to create an enabling envi-
ronment for freedom of expression.
In its Informationsverein Lentia judgment, the Court found, seminally, that the State is 
the ultimate guarantor of pluralism, especially in the audiovisual media sector (ECtHRs, 
1993, § 38). The implications of this positive obligation have since been teased out, most 
notably in Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland (ECtHRs, 2001, § 73) and in Manole 
& Others v. Moldova (ECtHRs, 2009c, §§ 98 and 107). In Verein gegen Tierfabriken, for 
instance, the Court held:
It is true that powerful financial groups can obtain competitive advantages in the are-
as of commercial advertising and may thereby exercise pressure on, and eventually 
curtail the freedom of, the radio and television stations broadcasting the commer-
cials. Such situations undermine the fundamental role of freedom of expression in a 
democratic society as enshrined in Article 10 of the Convention, in particular where 
it serves to impart information and ideas of general interest, which the public is mo-
reover entitled to receive. Such an undertaking cannot be successfully accomplished 
unless it is grounded in the principle of pluralism of which the State is the ultimate 
guarantor. This observation is especially valid in relation to audio-visual media, whose 
programmes are often broadcast very widely. (ECtHRs, 2001, § 73)
It is important to note in this connection the Court’s express linking of freedom of ex-
pression, democratic society, pluralism and “especially” the audio-visual media, “whose 
programmes are often broadcast very widely”. If the reason for singling out the audio-
visual media is the wide reach of their programmes, then these arguments clearly apply 
mutatis mutandis to Internet-based media and communication. In this linkage, freedom 
of expression-democratic society-pluralism-media, the crucial connecting element is a 
diversity of active voices. There is a role for the State not only in activating individual 
voices, but in activating a sufficient number and range of voices for the composite whole 
to be genuinely diverse. 
Notwithstanding the potential of the State’s role as the ultimate guarantor of pluralism 
in democratic society, the positive obligations engendered by that role do not extend to 
guaranteeing individuals a so-called “freedom of forum” (ECtHRs, 2003, § 47) or access 
to a particular medium/service (ECtHRs, 1995, 2000b, 2001, 2002). The applicants in 
the Appleby case argued that the shopping centre to which they sought to gain access 
should be regarded as a “quasi-public” space because it was de facto a forum for commu-
nication. The Court held that:
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[Article 10, ECHR], notwithstanding the acknowledged importance of freedom of 
expression, does not bestow any freedom of forum for the exercise of that right. 
While it is true that demographic, social, economic and technological developments 
are changing the ways in which people move around and come into contact with each 
other, the Court is not persuaded that this requires the automatic creation of rights 
of entry to private property, or even, necessarily, to all publicly-owned property (Go-
vernment offices and ministries, for instance). Where however the bar on access to 
property has the effect of preventing any effective exercise of freedom of expres-
sion or it can be said that the essence of the right has been destroyed, the Court 
would not exclude that a positive obligation could arise for the State to protect the 
enjoyment of Convention rights by regulating property rights. ((emphasis added) EC-
tHRs, 2003, § 47)
Instead, the Court tends to place store by the existence of viable expressive alternatives 
to the particular one denied. In determining whether alternative expressive opportuni-
ties are actually viable in the circumstances of a given case, it is important to be mindful 
of the Court’s Khurshid Mustafa & Tarzibachi judgment (ECtHRs, 2008b, § 45), in which 
it correctly rejected the assumption that different media are functionally equivalent. Di-
fferent media have different purposes and are used differently by different individuals 
and groups in society: they are not necessarily interchangeable (for further analysis, see 
McGonagle, 2012: 118-124). 
Perhaps the most far-reaching positive obligation in relation to freedom of expression to 
be identified by the Court to date concerns the enablement of freedom of expression in a 
very broad sense. In Dink v. Turkey, the Court stated that States are required to create a 
favourable environment for participation in public debate for everyone and to enable the 
expression of ideas and opinions without fear (ECtHRs, 2010, § 137). This finding contains 
great potential for further development, including in respect of online communication, al-
though the Court’s earlier reluctance to recognise any positive obligation in the Appleby 
case is likely to continue to prove a limitation on that potential (for analysis, see: McGona-
gle, 2012; Mac Síthigh, 2013). The future development of the positive obligations doctrine 
will certainly be guided by the Court’s gradual but growing appreciation of the specificities 
of the online communications environment, as well as the realisation that the State can 
play a variety of roles in relation to freedom of expression. 
191
MEDIA POLICY AND REGULATION: ACTIVATING VOICES, ILLUMINATING SILENCES
THE STATE AND BEYOND: ACTIVATING (NON-)MEDIA VOICES
III. Changing roles of the media and the State
If there ever was a time when the media could accurately have been described as a uni-
fied, homogenous entity, it is long gone. Today, heterogeneity in the media is the order of 
the day. The unitary appearance and catch-all character of the term ‘media’ masks a more 
complex range of different media types, the most readily distinguishable of which in-
clude public service, commercial, community, local, transnational, etc. While broadbrush 
and summary, this typology suffices at least to indicate that different media types have 
different objectives, target audiences and levels of geographical reach.
Moreover, in recent years, due mainly to the advent and relentless growth of the internet, 
the media have been undergoing profound changes; they are generally becoming increa-
singly instantaneous, international and interactive (see generally, Jakubowicz, 2009). In 
tandem, ideas, information and content of all kinds are generally becoming more abun-
dant, accessible and amplified to wider sections of society. As a result of these changes, 
the current content offering is more plentiful and varied than it has been at any point in 
history. These developments have prompted observations that internet content is “as 
diverse as human thought” (US District Courts, 1996, para. 74). There is now a greater 
range of media at our disposal than ever before, offering wider and more diversified 
functionalities/capabilities and greater differentiation in types of access, participation 
and output. As already noted in the introduction, the media are clearly no longer what 
they used to be. 
These advances in information and communications technologies can clearly have far-
reaching consequences for how information and ideas are disseminated and processed. 
The internet holds unprecedented potential for multi-directional communicative activi-
ty: unlike traditional media, it entails relatively low entry barriers. Whereas in the past 
it was necessary to negotiate one’s way through the institutionalized media in order to 
get one’s message to the masses, this is no longer the case. There is reduced dependence 
on traditional points of mediation and anyone can, in principle, set up a website or com-
municate via social media. Messages therefore can - and do - spread like wildfire across 
the globe. Often, all that is needed for a message to “go viral” is a combination of stra-
tegy and happenstance. While there are no guarantees that an individual’s message will 
actually reach vast international audiences, the capacity to communicate on such a scale 
clearly does now exist for an ever-expanding section of the population. The proverbial 
camel now has to pass through a considerably enlarged needle-eye. In consequence – and 
again as already noted in the introduction – the media are no longer the dominant voice 
in public debate, as they used to be.
These developments have prompted the realisation that a broad range of actors can 
make viable contributions to public debate. In the past, because of their dominant posi-
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tion in the communications sector, the media were effectively the gate-keepers or mo-
derators of public debate. Technological advances have reduced the erstwhile influence/
control of the media and made it possible for a greater range and diversity of actors to 
participate meaningfully in public debate (see generally: Jakubowicz, 2009). The Court’s 
appreciation of the importance of individual contributions to public debate is clear from 
its judgment in Steel & Morris v. the United Kingdom, when it held that:
[I]n a democratic society even small and informal campaign groups […] must be able 
to carry on their activities effectively and […] there exists a strong public interest 
in enabling such groups and individuals outside the mainstream to contribute to the 
public debate by disseminating information and ideas on matters of general public 
interest […]. (ECtHRs, 2010, § 89)
This recognition by the Court of the important contribution that groups and individuals 
(and not only media) can make to public debate has, in effect, expanded the traditional 
parameters of media and information-related pluralism. Non-media actors have, in prin-
ciple, been brought in from the periphery of the pluralism discussions. This is very sig-
nificant, given the proliferation of non-media contributors to public debate in the online 
environment. It is also very significant because it has implications for the range of voices 
that the State is required to activate. 
IV. The activation of non-media voices
That the media are no longer what they used to be is largely due to technology-driven 
changes within the media. That they are no longer the force that they were in the past 
is more readily attributable to extraneous technology-driven changes, in particular the 
emergence and continuing emergence of new media actors and non-media actors. Alan 
Rusbridger, editor-in-chief of The Guardian, captures the nature of ongoing shifts in 
public communication paradigms when he aptly refers to the “Splintering of the Fourth 
Estate” (Rusbridger, 2010). This splintering process is part of an ongoing, “deeper trans-
formation […] that challenges the ontology on which the mass communication paradigm 
was based” (Couldry, 2009: 438). The transformation involves the blurring of previously 
distinct boundaries between production and consumption of media; professionalism and 
amateurism and the huge variety in types of media, media services and media content.
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In his comprehensive and influential study, A new notion of media?, Karol Jakubowicz 
distinguishes three new notions of media: (i) all media are new-media-to-be;43 (ii) forms 
of media created by new actors, and (iii) media or media-like activities performed by 
non-media actors (Jakubowicz, 2009: 19 et seq.). Three topical examples of new media 
actors or non-media actors (depending on how they are defined) are: non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), whistle-blowers and bloggers (Traimer, 2012). They contribute to 
public debate in different ways: by taking on the public watchdog function of the media 
and by creating forums in which public debate can take place. 
The Court has in recent times repeatedly recognised that “when a non-governmental or-
ganisation is involved in matters of public interest [...] it is exercising a role as a public 
watchdog of similar importance to that of the press” (ECtHRs: 2013a, § 103; 2013b, 
§§ 20, 25), thereby entitling it to “similar Convention protection to that afforded to 
the press” (ECtHRs: 2009a, § 27; 2013b, § 20). The Court has also introduced the term 
“social” watchdog to denote civil society organizations carrying out this role (ECtHRs: 
2009a, § 36). The Court’s recognition of the value of NGOs’ contribution to public de-
bate (ECtHRs: 2004, 2009a, 2009b) and ability to play the role of public or social wa-
tchdog is not surprising. There are numerous similarities between NGOs and journalists 
or media, after all. NGOs, especially the better-resourced ones, invest in increasingly 
professional(ised) media and information strategies, often employing (former) journa-
lists for that purpose. Human rights NGOs, in particular, often conduct, and publish the 
outcomes of, fact-finding missions in ways similar to investigative journalism (Fenton, 
2010). And, of course, contemporary media strategies of both mainstream media and 
NGOs include a strong and active social media presence.
Whistle-blowers – individuals whom, acting in good faith and for reasons of principle 
and/or conscience, (illegally) disclose confidential information because of its overriding 
public-interest value - are quintessential public watchdogs. The importance of their con-
tributions to public debate have been resoundingly demonstrated by the revelations of 
Edward Snowden over the past months. The so-called “Snowden effect” has forced online 
privacy onto international and national political agendas and triggered unprecedented 
levels of public debate on relevant issues. Whistle-blowing websites – most famous-
ly WikiLeaks, but including other initiatives, like Publeaks (https://www.publeaks.nl/), 
a recent collaborative initiative by several Dutch media organisations, facilitate the 
practice of secure, anonymous whistle-blowing. The importance of whistle-blowers’ con-
tributions to public debate has already been recognised by the Court (ECtHRs 2008a and 
43 Whereas the other two new notions of media are self-explanatory, this one may require additional explanation. 
As Jakubowicz himself writes: “With the digitisation of all media, they may all be transformed into convergent me-
dia distributed on broadband networks. Older media will not be substituted for and disappear, but may re-emerge in 
changed form, as another source of content available on broadband Internet and other broadband networks”: Jakubo-
wicz, 2009: p. 19.
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2011) and in other standard-setting work by the Council of Europe (CoE PA 2010a & b) 
and that recognition is likely to develop further in the future (see further, Austin, 2012, 
and more broadly, Benkler, 2011).
A burgeoning blogosphere is nowadays the source of myriad contributions to public de-
bate. Of course, not all blogs have the ambition to contribute to public debate. Many 
blogs are personal in character and as such target personal networks and communities of 
interest. It is important, therefore, to avoid generalising about the nature, purpose and 
impact of blogs. Even within the range of blogs that do contribute to public debate, more 
specific typologies can be useful to further specify the nature of their contribution to 
news-making. For example, it can be useful to distinguish between media blogs, journa-
list blogs, audience blogs and citizen blogs (Domingo & Heinonen, 2008: 7 et seq.; for fur-
ther insightful commentary, see Jakubowicz, 2009: 21 et seq.). The sub-category, “public 
watchblog”, has even been put forward to denote blogs that take on the public watchdog 
role (Oosterveld & Oostveen, 2013). Although the Court has not yet explicitly recognised 
the value of bloggers’ contributions to public debate (including those of micro-bloggers 
such as Twitter-users), such a step would be very much in keeping with the Court’s earlier 
finding in its Steel & Morris judgment (cited above).
V. Concluding remarks: the challenge  
of activating non-media voices
Having recognised the importance of non-media voices for pluralistic public debate, the 
challenge is now to activate those voices, including through regulatory and policy measu-
res. The foregoing analysis suggests that States are under a positive obligation to (pro-)
actively take measures designed to activate a broader range of voices. 
In his keynote speech at the 1st Council of Europe Conference of Ministers responsible 
for Media and New Communication Services in Reykjavik in May 2009, Karol Jakubowicz 
challenged the Council of Europe and its Member States to develop a modern and com-
prehensive policy for digital and legacy media (Jakubowicz 2011: 15-19; see also, Jaku-
bowicz 2009). He urged policy-makers to look more closely at the proliferation of new 
types of media, how they operate and the context in which they operate, as well as their 
relationship to freedom of expression. This great challenge for the Council of Europe is 
by no means unique to the Council of Europe. It is shared by regulators and policy-makers 
at all levels, and also by academics. The challenge is to move on from the traditional 
“mass communication paradigm” built on the “one-to-many pattern” (Couldry, 2009: 437-
438; see also in this connection: Van Cuilenburg & McQuail, 2003) and to embrace the 
networked reality of the new communications dispensation. 
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The Council of Europe attempted to pick up the gauntlet thrown down by Jakubowicz by 
adopting a new standard-setting text – a Recommendation by the organisation’s Com-
mittee of Ministers – on “a new notion of media” in 2011 (CoE CM, 2011). The Recommen-
dation states, amongst other things, that “[a]ll actors – whether new or traditional – who 
operate within the media ecosystem should be offered a policy framework which guaran-
tees an appropriate level of protection and provides a clear indication of their duties and 
responsibilities in line with Council of Europe standards” (ibid., para. 7). It continues by 
stating that the “response should be graduated and differentiated according to the part 
that media services play in content production and dissemination processes” (ibid.). 
With its central focus on (new) media, the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation 
does not champion the cause of non-media voices as strongly or as expressly as it could 
perhaps have done. More generally, while the Recommendation explores a wide array of 
issues, it does not trace the principles governing those issues from the Court’s relevant 
case-law in a meticulous, explicit and targeted fashion. The corollary of these critical ob-
servations is that the Court’s recognition of the importance of non-media and individual 
voices for pluralistic public debate has yet to be properly teased out in relevant Council 
of Europe policy-making circles and political texts. 
This brief article has sought to show that the Court’s case-law has a broader relevance 
for (media) pluralism debates than is often appreciated (c.f. Komorek, 2009). It has also 
sought to card the human rights law thread of (media) pluralism, before it is properly 
spun into a truly multi-stranded discussion.
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